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Abstract
This is critical review of Richard Dean’ book, The Value of Humanity in Kant’s Moral Theory. Dean’s book was evaluated, 
and some of his interpretations of Kant were critiqued. However, it concludes that Dean’s book is illuminating especially, as 
regards the distinction he made between consent and informed consent and their roles in biomedical practice.
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The Value of Humanity in Kant’s Moral Philosophy is a criti-
cal exploration of the core themes in Kant’s ethics, namely, 
the notions of humanity, dignity, good will, autonomy and 
end-in-itself. There is no gainsaying that Kant’s humanity 
thesis, which is the bedrock for which this book was written, 
appears to stand out among the other two formulations—The 
Universal Law of Nature Formulation and the Autonomy 
Formulation. Most commentators seem to allude to this fact 
in that the humanity thesis seems logically attractive and 
appeals to our intuitions, and it is the grounds for all norma-
tive theories, especially, in applied ethics. As Richard Dean 
points out at the start of this book, the tricky challenge of 
the humanity thesis is the explanation of the moral obliga-
tions it implies (p. 4). Addressing this challenge, therefore, 
demands an apt explication of its logic vis-à-vis our conven-
tional moral intuitions. This, among other things, is a task 
that Dean sets to achieve in this book.
Dean begins his analysis with a distinction between the 
meaning of humanity as construed by some contemporary 
interpreters and the actual meaning of humanity. According 
to him, “specialists in Kant’s ethics regard Kantian humanity 
as some feature possessed by rational beings, and not just as 
the property of being a member of the human species. This 
seems correct to me. But there is more disagreement than is 
generally recognized about exactly which characteristic of 
rational beings Kant means to pick out as the ‘humanity’ that 
must be treated as an end in itself” (p. 5). The disagreement 
is because these scholars believe that the status of humanity 
is accorded to all well-informed adult human beings that 
possess at least a minimal rationality, which is logically erro-
neous. “Humanity, in the sense of the humanity formulation, 
is indeed equivalent to some feature possessed by rational 
beings, but not by all minimally rational beings. More so, 
‘humanity’ is Kant’s name for the more fully rational nature 
that is only possessed by a being who accepts moral princi-
ples as providing suicient reasons for action. The humanity 
that should be treated as an end in itself is a properly ordered 
will, which gives priority to moral considerations over self-
interest. To employ Kant’s terminology, the end in itself is 
a good will” (p. 6).
Consequently, it is not all human beings that are qualiied 
to be enrolled into the college of Kantian humanity. The 
only qualiication is that such human being, despite being 
rational, must give priority to moral considerations over per-
sonal inclinations and aggrandizements. This interpretation 
seems problematic on two grounds. First, it seems to sug-
gest that criminals may not be qualiied to be accorded the 
status of humanity, and by extension, may not possess dig-
nity, since their actions are inluenced by their inclinations 
and appeal to the hypothetical imperative. A closer read-
ing of Kant seems to contradict this Deanian interpretation. 
Because, Kant equates dignity with humanity, and believes 
that the possession of dignity and being part of humanity is 
not limited to acting in accordance to good will. Moreover, 
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to possess dignity does not imply acting in a morally good 
or plausible way. Dignity is a deinitive quality that deines 
the nature of human beings, and it is, according to Kant, a 
prerogative, which human beings have over all other natural 
beings (Groundwork, p. 4:436, p. 4:438). The implication of 
this is that possessing dignity is independent of our moral 
probity.
The second problem is the restriction of the idea of 
humanity and dignity to only those who are rationally 
competent, and the preclusion of marginal cases like little 
babies, demented patients and those in coma. This interpre-
tation seems anti-Kantian. Kant views dignity as an inherent 
moral worth, which deines the humanity (humanness) of 
all human beings. The deinition of humanity as a status for 
‘fully rational nature that is only possessed by a being who 
accepts moral principles as providing suicient reasons for 
action’, therefore, seems problematic. In his Metaphysics of 
Morals, Kant believes that what characterizes humanity and 
distinguishes it from animality is the capacity to set ends—
‘any end whatsoever’ (p. 392). Being able to set ends isn’t an 
exclusive privilege a of fully rational nature but a privilege 
of all rational nature, irrespective of their degree of maturity. 
Children or demented patients may not be able to set ends 
in an instrumental or practical fashion given some physi-
ological and psychological inhibitions, that does not suggest 
that they lack the capacity to set ends. For those with severe 
neurological or biological disabilities, they remain perpetu-
ally inhibited. So, we could say that their capacity to set ends 
is inert or latent.
Dean attacks the interpretation of the notion of good will, 
especially as deined by H. J. Paton and Lewis White Beck. 
According to him, Paton and Beck view good will as “’… 
one which acts for the sake of duty…. An action having 
this motive (the motive of duty) is moral…’. According to 
this view, a good will is exactly a will that performs dutiful 
actions because they are required by duty” (p. 19). Dean 
believes that it is plausible to argue that an agent possesses 
a good will if his actions are done from the motives of duty, 
the will is not a passive possessor but an active possessor 
of that which is good. The fundamental characteristic of 
human is the power of choice. A good will, therefore, is 
one that chooses to perform a morally worthy action. The 
idea of good will, thus, according to Paton and Beck seem 
oversimpliied.
Dean distinguished between two kinds of will: will as 
choice and the will that makes available the practical laws 
upon which all choices are based. Whereas the former is 
referred to as Willkur, latter is referred to as Wille. The 
morality worthiness of an action depends on the extent to 
which Willkur conforms with Wille. When the Wille of an 
agent governs his Willkur, we say that such moral agent, 
aside being fully rational, possesses a will that is good. 
“In order for an agent’s will to be good, she must have a 
commitment to act morally even when acting morally 
requires her to forgo the satisfaction of inclinations (she 
must make the moral law ‘the supreme condition of the sat-
isfaction’ of her inclinations)” (p. 20). This Deanian inter-
pretation seems to give credence to Marcia Baron’s idea of 
over-determinism, in which duty regulates our inclinations 
as a secondary motive, without extricating it from the mor-
ally active scene. Agents control their inclinations, making 
sure that for no reason would their inclinations become the 
determining factor of his moral action. This act of control 
is a moral commitment, which an agent must develop and 
master in order to perform actions that can be adjudged mor-
ally justiied.
Another concept which Dean thinks is integral to Kant’s 
moral theory is the concept of autonomy. Autonomy is the 
underlying principle of all human dignity and it is a dein-
ing principle of all human nature. It is reason that makes 
autonomy possible. Dean lists three functions of reason in 
Kant’s Philosophy: “…reason is pure self-activity, which 
makes rational beings fundamentally active instead of pas-
sive. In his theoretical philosophy, reason is the faculty that 
spontaneously and freely provides rules for organizing the 
‘intuitions’ of sense that we passively receive. In his practi-
cal philosophy, reason freely and spontaneously provides 
the moral principles that present truly self-given reasons 
for action, independent of the inluence of inclinations (p. 
227). To be autonomous, hence, is to be a self-legislating 
agent, and by extension an end-in-itself. This sort of value-
laden role ascribed to autonomy stirs an ontological conlict 
between the humanity formulation and the autonomy for-
mulation. Which of these formulations underlies morality? 
Dean explains that based on Kant’s analysis, autonomy is the 
foundation of dignity. To wit, the possibility of a good will 
depends on whether moral principles that guide our actions 
are autonomously legislated. Without this autonomous leg-
islation, the actions of human beings may be based on ‘their 
strongest desire’. And, their actions would not be diferent 
from other beings in nature (p. 228). Moreover, viewing 
autonomy as an end-in-itself does not imply overriding the 
strategic role of good will in the moral scheme. Autonomy 
and good will complements each other. They are two sides 
of a moral coin. While a good will is the prerequisite that 
renders the contingent moral aspirations of an agent morally 
valuable, the will itself, must be autonomous in order to 
choose what is good. The will must autonomously legislate 
moral principles that are not subject to any inclination but 
are only constrained by moral laws.
Since the postulation of the notion of autonomy by Kant, 
some bioethicists like Gerald Dworkin have appropriated 
the concept as a normative principle to evaluative doctors-
patients relationship (1976, p. 23). The concept of autonomy 
also underlies most biomedical research guidelines, and it 
accentuates the ethical imperative that all potential research 
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participants “have a right to choose freely whether to par-
ticipate in research” (CIOMS 2016, p. 34), because they 
are intrinsically valuable and morally autonomous. Histori-
cally speaking, the idea of autonomy is often invoked as a 
reaction against the culture of paternalistic decisions, which 
underlie the medical profession for several decades, espe-
cially, in America and several parts of Europe (even though 
it is signiicantly present in medical practices in Africa). 
The wrongness of paternalism, as some anti-paternalistic 
proponents have averred, is that it interferes with the autono-
mous decisions and actions of individuals (Birks 2018, p. 
138). The respect of autonomy seems to imply the respect 
of an individual’s right to self-determine their actions and 
legislate on their preferred choices, without any interfer-
ence, whatsoever. However, Dean contends that “… respect 
for autonomy amounts to little more than a demand to let 
patients make choices about their medical care or for poten-
tial volunteers to either accept or refuse research participa-
tion. This emphasis on choice, sometimes to the exclusion of 
any other aspect of respect for autonomy, is understandable, 
given the original role of the principle” (p. 199). The empha-
sis on the rights of patient’s autonomy, thus, is to show what 
could be wrong when patients are excluded in medical deci-
sion making about their medical treatment.
The demand that patients’ choices be respected may be 
morally acceptable, nevertheless, it creates a leeway for blind 
consent, which medical experts often exploit. Therefore, the 
respect for autonomy requires a higher demand for rationale 
behind all possible alternatives opened to choice. The jus-
tiication for requiring a doctor to make adequate informa-
tion available before obtaining consents from patients to this 
end, according to Dean, “allows patients to make choices 
that it with their overall desires, goals, and attitudes. This 
is the real requirement and intuitive force of the principle 
of respect for autonomy, and it accords with most explicit 
formulations of that principle” (p. 200). Dean’s introduction 
of the notions of choice and autonomy gives an illuminating 
insight into consent and informed consent dichotomy, and 
their diverse role in biomedical practice. While the idea of 
consent creates a possibility of blind choice, informed con-
sent opens a more robust ethical requirement, whereby the 
doctor becomes obligated to provide accurate information 
which would aid the participant or patient to make choices 
that express their desires and aspirations as self-legislating 
agents, and also, refrain from interferences that are gratui-
tous (p. 203). Importantly, informed consent bids the phy-
sician to make judgements that would be for the patient’s 
best interests. The judgments of physicians or biomedical 
researchers, therefore, ought to incorporate the duty of benef-
icence (obligation to improve the health and well-being of 
patients or research subjects and non-maleficence (the obli-
gation to ensure a non-deliberate cause of harm).
The idea of individual autonomy represented by Gerald 
Dworkin and also relected in Biomedical Research Ethics 
guidelines have come under attack because of its over-bur-
dened emphasis on the unrestricted right of an individual 
to make decisions based on motives, desires and aspira-
tions, and in protection of their interests and well-being. 
Childress, for instance, contends that the problem of indi-
vidual autonomy is that it focuses on just one aspect of our 
personhood, which is, self-determination, neglecting the 
socio-cultural and historical embodiment of our personhood. 
Also, the proponents of individual autonomy do not consider 
the possibility of misplaced, ambivalent, or even contradic-
tory preferences (1990, p. 13). In order cases, some choices 
may be borne out the motivation to impress the consentee. 
For instance, if a well-known clinical researcher goes to the 
locality where she is well-known to recruit research par-
ticipants, the possibility of recruiting several participants is 
very high. But, irrespective of the informed consent rituals, 
the participants may decide to consent based on the grounds 
of deference to the researcher, even when they would pre-
fer to choose not to participate when it involves someone 
else. Childress, and of course, Beauchamp believe that a 
better idea of autonomy should be personal autonomy or 
what Dean calls ‘a Minimalist Self-Deterministic account 
of Autonomy’ (MSDA). According to them, personal auton-
omy or MSDA entails the capacity to make indivdual deci-
sion or choose a preferred course of action, which at mini-
mum, is free from controlling inluence by others and from 
limitations, such as insuicient understanding that makes 
it impossible for the autonomous agent to make meaning-
ful choices (Beauchamp and Childress 2001 qtd in Varelius 
2006, p. 377).
A signiicant criterion of personal autonomy as construed 
by Beauchamp and Childress is that in as much as an indi-
vidual possesses a moral capacity to make choices and deci-
sions, such capacity must not impede certain factors that 
could regulate the decisions he makes (1994, p. 121). Where 
your choice poses a threat to your attaining desired goals, 
other factors external to you must be allowed to act on your 
choice so that the desired goal can be attained. A fundamen-
tal consideration in ascertaining moral grounds for medical 
decision should be based on medical interest. For instance, 
in the case of a mentally retarded person, “it is irrelevant in 
determining whether treatment is in the patient’s best inter-
est” (1994, p. 216). There should not be confusion between 
the value of life for others and the patient’s quality of life. In 
a situation where a patient is incapacitated and incompetent 
to make decisions as regards his or her health condition, the 
incompetent patient’s best medical interests generally should 
suice even if these interests’ conlict with the interests of 
the family of the incompetent patient. According to Dean, 
the choice of taking a minimalist stance on autonomy is 
to make “autonomous choice the central object of concern 
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in the principle of respect for autonomy, instead of assign-
ing this central role to autonomy as a property of persons” 
(p. 204). Nevertheless, this stance of autonomy is problem-
atic because though it permits a minimal interference on 
an agent’s choice if their choice were incompetently made, 
it restricts interference on “the inconsistent decisions of 
someone halfway in the grip of unusual religious beliefs” (p. 
204) like an individual who refuses to accept blood transfu-
sion after childbirth, even when it is clear that not doing so 
would result in her death. More so, if the autonomous and 
intentional choice is what MSDA seems to promote and pre-
serve, Dean believes that it is diicult to see why all choices 
shouldn’t be respected, even if it is unrelective. This is not 
to suggest that Dean supports unrelective choices but to 
point to the inadequacies of individual and personal accounts 
of autonomy.
Kant’s view of autonomy, which is distinct from indi-
vidual and personal autonomy is ‘metaphysically laden’ 
and morally grounded. It is metaphysically laden because 
he dissociates autonomy from the individual and the per-
sonality of the individual and anchors it on the will. It is 
therefore the will that is autonomous. Kant explains that a 
will that is autonomous is that which conforms to the moral 
law. The will is a kind of causality, which deines all beings 
that are part of rational nature. To be human, thus, is to pos-
sess a will. The nature of a will depends on the motivations 
that stimulates its willing. A good will, thus, “is not good 
because of what it efects or accomplishes, because of its 
itness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its 
volition, that is, it is good in itself and, regarded for itself, is 
to be valued incomparably higher than all that could merely 
be brought about by it in favor of some inclination and 
indeed, if you will, of the sum of all inclinations” (Ground-
works, p. 4:395 Emphasis is mine). Dean explains that 
because good will is volition-dependent, it is the grounds 
for autonomy. According to him, to be autonomous is to 
possess good will. In other words, to be able to perform an 
autonomous action, one must necessarily possess a good 
will, and it is what gives value to the action of a moral agent 
(p. 255). To act on good will is to act morally, but to act 
without recourse to good will is “to choose to act immorally 
in order to satisfy inclinations” (p. 255). So, to perform good 
or morally acceptable acts is to act in accordance to auton-
omy. It also means to act on the grounds or motivation of 
reason because only reason and not incentive directs an act 
to conform to moral law. This idea of autonomy is restricted 
to an agent that wills a moral action. It is not relational—it 
is not expressed in relation to another moral agent.
How would Deanian-Kantian good will interpretation of 
autonomy address the problems of informed consent and 
moral decision-making in medical practice and biomedi-
cal research? A possible response by Dean would be that 
a doctor or a patient, for instance, could be said to have 
acted autonomously if their actions are morally grounded, 
that is, if their actions are morally justiied. If a doctor gives 
a false diagnosis to a patient in order to keep them perpetu-
ally and hopelessly in their hospital just for commercial 
gains, such a doctor acts immorally and cannot claim to 
have acted autonomously as the motivation of the action isn’t 
good will but self-aggrandizement. While this may seem 
like an abstract moralization, it does not seem to address 
in practical terms some complexities that occur in medi-
cal practice. For instance, it doesn’t answer the question of 
whether a doctor acts autonomously when he treats a cancer 
patient or performs a Cesarean Section on a woman with 
an ectopic pregnancy against the will of the patient. It is 
also diicult to see how the good will account of autonomy 
helps to explain patients or research participants’ decisions. 
For instance, it is diicult to see how that account holds a 
clinical researcher culpable for recruiting a participant who 
agreed to participate in a clinical research on the grounds 
of (monetary or therapeutic) incentives advertised during 
the recruitment process. If a participant willingly agrees to 
participate in such a trial not through coercion but simply to 
enjoy the gains of the advertised incentives (either because 
they are sick or due to their impoverished conditions), can 
we say that they acted autonomously? Or, if a cancer patient 
agrees to the decision of doctor to treat her without being 
interested in the details, can we say that the cancer patient 
acted autonomously? The good will account does not ofer 
any response.
The abstract moralization of autonomy pokes Secker to 
claim that “Kant’s concept of moral autonomy is not a con-
cept we should attempt to “plug into” bioethics’ principle 
of respect for autonomy because of its undesirability as an 
ideal and its impracticability in assessment contexts” (1999, 
p. 52). Endorsing Secker’s attack on this Deanian-Kantian 
abstract moralization of autonomy, Saad argues that
it is unrealistic because many people, especially sick 
and vulnerable patients, are incapable of the sort of 
philosophical gymnastics Kant requires. Furthermore, 
because Kant equates acting autonomously with acting 
morally, applying Kant’s autonomy to clinical practice 
would, in a sense, make doctors arbitrators of patient 
morality. If patients have a duty to act autonomously… 
and if doctors are to gauge patient autonomy, the 
patient will be subjected to a physical and moral exam-
ination before undergoing treatment (2018, p. 130).
All these criticisms are plausible only because Kant’s 
view of autonomy is explored in part.
A broader and practical exploration of Kant’s view of 
autonomy reveals that while Kant is interested in moral 
goodness of an agent, he is also interested in how that mor-
ally good agent treats another agent. For instance, Kant 
believes that it is morally despicable to tell lies. So, if a 
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doctor lies to a cancer patient that there is no hope for them 
to get healed just to make the patient stay perpetually in 
their care simply for commercial gains, Kant believes that 
such action is morally despicable because “whatever mili-
tates against frankness lowers the dignity of man” (Lecture 
on Ethics 1963, p. 231). Kant deines a lie as a “falsiloquim 
in praejudicium humanitatis - false statement prejudicial 
to humanity” (Lecture on Ethics 1963, p. 227, translation 
is mine). He however adds that not every statement that is 
untrue is a lie. Because “if we were to be at all times punctil-
iously truthful, we might often become victims of the wick-
edness of others who were ready to abuse our truthfulness” 
(Lecture on Ethics, p. 228). A pharmacist who sells vita-
min C to a drug addict in place of Codeine tablet may have 
deceived the drug addict to believe that they have bought a 
psychoactive drug when they have only got a medicine that 
would help boost their body vitamin. Kant does not believe 
that the pharmacist has acted in a morally despicable way 
but in good will. But Dean’s good will account does not 
account for the role lies or truthfulness plays in deining 
moral goodness.
The concept, which is very central to Kant’s moral 
autonomy, which is missing in the good will account is 
the idea of mere means. To be autonomous is to act in 
such a way that one does not treat the other as a mere 
means. The ‘non-use as mere means’ view suggests that 
all human beings ought to be treated with respect because 
they possess intrinsic value. Though Dean situates value-
ness in the moral goodness of an action, Kant believes 
that irrespective of our moral status, because we are part 
of rational nature, we are intrinsically and unconditionally 
invaluable, that is, we possess inviolable dignity. For Kant, 
“a human being… is not a thing and hence not something 
that can be used merely as a means but must in all his 
actions always be regarded as an end in itself” (Ground-
work 1997, p. 38). To act autonomously is to treat others 
as ends rather than as mere means. A will which makes it 
possible for an agent to treat others as ends is a good will. 
A good will is a will that conforms to the moral principles 
of reason. Another way to explain this is to say that an 
individual performs actions autonomously when they will 
action that are determined by rational moral principles. 
An autonomous action is distinguished from a heterono-
mous action. While autonomous actions are motivated by 
practical reason, heteronomous actions are motivated by 
feelings, inclinations ad pathologies. One cannot claim to 
be autonomous when their actions are controlled by feel-
ings and inclination because the reason for such actions 
is illegitimate as well as defective. A captivating way of 
describing an autonomously willed action is to see it as 
“the product of a process of deliberation which involves 
scrutiny of the reasons underlying our proposed actions 
to ensure that they meet certain standards of rationality” 
(Campbell 2017, p. 388). So, scrutinizing our actions in 
conformity to moral imperatives is vital to autonomy. 
More speciically, our autonomous will is constrained by 
moral principled to act in the morally plausible way. This 
broader account of autonomy views autonomy not as a 
self-deterministic capacity, which is devoid of interfer-
ence. This account is based on the capacity of a will to will 
a good action through rational deliberation. Deanian good 
will account of autonomy does not consider this aspect 
of moral scrutiny or deliberation. But a broader Kantian 
reading shows that this is very fundamental in Kant’s dis-
cussion of autonomy.
There is, therefore, a sense in which Kant’s moral auton-
omy sits prominently within an ineluctable pluralistic moral 
deliberation that is primal to bioethics and medical practice. 
Kant’s autonomy, just to reiterate, is manifested in a moral 
action in which moral duties or obligations are met, and 
in which the rights, well-beings and dignity of others are 
respected. This is because, an individual cannot claim to 
be autonomous when they don’t act in reference to every 
other moral agent. So, every human action ought to base on 
“informed reason and autonomously held, principled com-
mitments” (Stirrat and Gill 2005, p. 127). More speciically, 
Kant’s view of autonomy “requires that we act only on prin-
ciples that can be principles for all; it provides a basis for an 
account of the underlying principles of universal obligations 
and rights that can structure relationships between agents” 
(O’Neill 2002, p. 96). So, autonomy that is based on the 
‘underlying principles of universal obligations’ does not tol-
erate deception, manipulation or coercion. This is expressed 
through “truthful communication, through care not to mis-
lead, through avoidance of exaggeration, through simplicity 
and explicitness, through honesty in dealing with others, in 
a word, through trustworthiness” (O’Neill 2002, p. 98). In 
the ield of bioethics and medical practice, Kant’s autonomy 
could be expressed, thus, where in a clinical researcher and 
a research participant, for instance, communicates to each 
other truthfully and attempts not to mislead each other. In the 
case of complex moral deliberation, the deliberating agents 
must act in a way that stimulates or promotes trustworthi-
ness. If, for instance, a patient wishes to accept blood trans-
fusion but is constrained by some religious belief system, 
and the doctor believes that is the only way to save her from 
an impeding danger of possible death, it is morally instruc-
tive that whatever decision that is arrived at must be such 
that is morally motivated by honesty, trustfulness and care 
not to mislead.
Even though the good will account expressed by Dean is 
insuicient to explain how Kant’s view of autonomy could 
help to address pluralistic moral issues that arise in bioethics 
and medical practice, it is, however, necessary. But, to see 
how that account could be applied to bioethics and medi-
cal practice, it must to be read in conjunction to the mere 
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means principle, in which our obligations to act are informed 
vis-à-vis respect for other moral agents (whether rationally 
competent or not).
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